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Abstract
The objective of this Essay is to add new information and analytical insights to the debate,
namely, research about how refugee and compensation solutions have been implemented in other
situations. Practical implementation options are examined from a variety of comparative experi-
ences. Examining these options could help soften the political absolutism that characterizes the
current impasse on the refugee issue. But there is value in any event in understanding the in-
ternational system context, and mapping realistic scenarios for such matters as an institutional
framework to implement a settlement, the criteria and procedures for relocating refugees, and
techniques and methods to award adequate compensation. It is, in effect, a tutorial on what has
worked in other settings, assuming a settlement of the conflict.
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I. THE VALUE OF COMPARISONS
A sustainable peace in the Middle East will require a solu-
tion to the problem of Palestinian refugees. Indeed, this is why
so much has been written about this issue in the context of
peace negotiations.' But this Essay takes a different approach,
offering comparative historical perspectives on the organization,
procedures, and criteria for implementing the right of return
and compensation for lost property. It is a technical and not a
political treatment.
The objective of this Essay is to add new information and
analytical insights to the debate, namely, research about how ref-
ugee and compensation solutions have been implemented in
other situations. Practical implementation options are ex-
amined from a.variety of comparative experiences. Examining
these options could help soften the political absolutism that
characterizes the current impasse on the refugee issue. But
there is value in any event in understanding the international
system context, and mapping realistic scenarios for such matters
as an institutional framework to implement a settlement, the cri-
teria and procedures for relocating refugees, and techniques
and methods to award adequate compensation. It is, in effect, a
tutorial on what has worked in other settings, assuming a settle-
ment of the conflict.
Arrangements relating to Palestinian refugees are in certain
ways distinct from generic refugee responses.2 Research and
* Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations.
1. See, e.g., Ami Ayalon & Sari Nusseibeh, Finding Common Ground: The Missing
Pieces of Middle East Peace, 2 SEATrLE J. SOCUAL JusT. 415 (2001).
2. See Michael Dumper, Comparative Perspectives on Repatriation and Resettlement of
Palestinian Refugees: The Cases of Guatemala, Bosnia, and Afghanistan, Paper prepared for
the International Conference on Israel and the Palestinian Refugees, Max Planck Inst.
for Comp. Pub. Law & Int'l Law (July 11-13, 2003).
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analysis relating to these topics are similarly divergent.3 A com-
parative approach can provide insights into the workability of a
prospective settlement, the broad parameters of which are dis-
cernible from recent negotiations. But as recognized by the cur-
rent head of the United Nations Relief and Works Administra-
tion ("UNRWA"), "No one is working on this."4
II. SITUATING THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE ISSUE
The recently-published Roadmap to Peace in the Middle
East5 is but the most recent reminder that the Palestinian refu-
gee issue will be a key aspect of any settlement of the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict. The Roadmap, authored by the Quartet (the Eu-
ropean Union, United Nations ("U.N."), Russia, and the United
States), and promoted now by U.S. President George W. Bush,
addresses at the outset a variety of issues ranging from security to
settlements.6 Plans for the humanitarian rehabilitation of the
West Bank and Gaza in this first phase, of course, would indi-
rectly affect many of the 1.5 million Palestinian refugees regis-
tered there, but it is the last phase relating to a final settlement,
where the refugee issue is explicitly featured. 7
After an international conference convened by the Quartet
in early 2004, there is to be "an agreed, just, fair, and realistic
solution to the refugee issue."8 This is an ambitious objective for
many reasons, including sheer numerosity. Currently, there are
some six million Palestinian exiles, nearly four million of whom
are registered as refugees under the mandate of the UNRWA
which operates in the region.9
3. See Susan M. Akram & Terry Rempel, Temporary Protection as an Instrument for
Implementing the Right of Return for Palestinian Refugees, 22 B.U. INT'L L.J. 24 (2004); see
also Justus R. Weiner, The Palestinian Refugees' "Right to Return" and the Peace Process, 20
B.C. INT'L & COMp. L. REv. 1, 1 n.1 (1997).
4. Interview with Peter Hansen, Commissioner-General, United Nations Relief &
Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East [UNRWA], in Amman,Jordan.
5. See The Secretary-General, Letter Dated 7 May 2003 from the Secretary-General Ad-
dressed to the President of the Security Council, Annex A: A Performance-Based Roadmap to a
Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, U.N. Doc. S/2003/529 (May
7, 2003).
6. See id. at 1-5.
7. See id. at 8.
8. Id.
9. See The Commissioner-General of the UNRWA, Report of the Commissioner-General
of the United Nations Relief and Works Agencyfor Palestine Refugees in the Near East, U.N. Doc.
A/59/13 (Oct. 19, 2004).
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Indeed, the refugee issue has surfaced periodically as nego-
tiations to settle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have waxed and
waned. Refugees were profiled recently in efforts by former U.S.
President Bill Clinton, who convened in July 2000 a summit
meeting at Camp David, Maryland, in an audacious bid to re-
solve the conflict."' The issue emerged centrally in the course of
the settlement gambit at Camp David, and follow-on exchanges
at Taba in Egypt.' 1 In these settings, they became a deal-blocker,
with both sides taking maximalist positions. 12 Israeli negotiators,
concerned about the demographic dimension, insisted on alter-
natives to an absolute right of return." Palestinian negotiators
have long insisted on a categorical right of return, arguing that
refugees should be given the maximum feasible choice in terms
of where to live in the future.' 4
In an attempt to finesse the return issue, a proposal was ta-
bled in these recent discussions for the relocation of refugees to
Israeli territory, which would then be transferred to a Palestinian
State.' 5 In addition, the United States proposed a financial pack-
age, reportedly of U.S.$10 billion, designed to break the impasse
and help buttress a peace agreement, while prepared to solicit
donations from other countries to compensate Palestinian refu-
gees. Palestinian negotiators have suggested that a figure of
scores or even hundreds of billions of dollars would be necessary
to constitute fair compensation. 16
Debates about the right of refugees to return to their homes
in what is now Israel will permeate political commentary as well
10. See Carole Basri, The Jewish Refugees from Arab Countries: An Examination of Legal
Rights-A Case Study of the Human Rights Violations of Iraqi Jews, 26 FORDHAM INT'L LJ.
656, 711-12 (2003); see also Hiba I. Husseini, Challenges and Reforms in the Palestinian
Authority, 26 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 500, 518 (2003).
11. See Husseini, supra note 10, 519-21.
12. See id. at 518-19.
13. See id. at 518.
14. See Frances Raday, Self-Determination and Minority Rights, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L. J.
453, 472-73 (2003).
15. See Private Response on Palestinian Refugees, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, Jan. 23,
2001, available at http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/cahier/proche-orient/israel
refugees-en.
16. See Atif A. Kubursi, Palestinian Losses in 1948: Calculating Refugee Compensation,
81 INFO. BRIEF, Aug. 3, 2001, available at http://www.thejerusalemfund.org/images/in-
formationbrief.php?ID=37.
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as settlement negotiations. 7 Yet, the absorption of refugees into
Israel will be highly controversial and will likely be severely lim-
ited, with Israeli negotiators never having agreed to accept back
more than 100,000 individuals annually even when the conflict
was fresh."R But the affirmation in principle of the right to re-
turn, and the reception of refugees into Israeli territory that is
then transferred to Palestinian sovereignty, as well as continued
family reunification admissions to Israel, may be feasible. In
fact, questions over family reunification have been raised repeat-
edly in refugee negotiations, even though the issue is analytically
distinct, with Israel agreeing in the past to admit 2,000 family
reunification cases annually (6000 persons)." Actual practice
has been more difficult to discern.20
In envisioning a resolution of the problem, the nearly
400,000 Palestinian refugees who are registered in Lebanon2"
have been prioritized in discussions as they are considered
among the most needy and likely to be pressured to leave after a
settlement.22 Also, both sides have discussed the establishment
of an international commission and fund to deal with compensa-
tion issues. 23 Both have suggested that relatively small sums of
compensation could be paid on a per capita basis to refugees in
fast track procedures. 24 But there is no meeting of the minds
relating to the method by which to calculate compensation, nor
is there agreement on the amount that would be contributed to
an international fund.25 Both sides have discussed UNRWA be-
ing phased-out, with the Palestinian side more favorable than
the Israeli side to a continuing role for the agency.
26
17. See generally Nabil Fahrny, The Global Challenges in the Middle East Region: An
Egyptian Perspective, 28 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFFAIRS 150 (2004).
18. See Jacob Tovy, Negotiating the Palestinian Refugees, 10 THE MIDDLE EAST Q.
(2003), available at http://www.meforum.org/article/543.
19. See id.
20. See generally Glenn Frankel, Israel Assailed for Family Separation, WASH. POST, Feb.
8, 1987, at A25.
21. See Deborah Sontag, Painful Glimpse of Home for Palestinians, N.Y. TIMES, May 30,
2000, at Al.
22. See Israeli Private Response on Palestinian Refugees, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, Jan.
23, 2001, available at http://mondediplo.com/focus/mideast/a327.
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See id.
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III. THE EARLY INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE: UNITED
NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS ADMINISTRATION
Historically, the principal international humanitarian re-
sponse to Palestinian refugees has been UNRWA, which was es-
tablished in 1949 by the U.N. General Assembly.27 When the
agency began operations in 1951, it sought to address the hu-
manitarian needs of some 900,000 refugees, 268,000 of whom
resided in 60 different camps in the region.28 Because the Gen-
eral Assembly did not define who was a Palestinian refugee,
agency officials developed their own registration criteria. 29 Ini-
tially, UNRWA policy documents defined a refugee as a person
who, as a result of the Palestinian conflict, had lost his home and
means of livelihood."0 Subsequently, this definition was further
refined, and UNRWA has come to consider a refugee to be a
person whose normal place of residence was Palestine during
the period June 1, 1946, to May 15, 1948, and who, as a result of
the Palestinian conflict, had lost both a home and means of live-
lihood, and the descendants of such a person. 1
In the early years, UNRWA began addressing the immediate
needs of Palestinian refugees in terms of shelter, education, food
and health services. 32 When the prospect for more enduring ar-
rangements seemed feasible, public works projects and small-
scale integration projects were initiated by the agency, 3 some-
times in the face of a highly suspicious refugee clientele who
feared the extinguishment of their right to return and the liqui-
dation of their cause through the promotion of assimilation and
resettlement schemes."4 In practice, refugee status was perpetu-
ated for political and economic reasons, and repatriation was
considered infeasible.15 This left the UN with a lasting humani-
tarian assistance commitment institutionalized in the form of
27. See G.A. Res. 302(V), U.N. Doc. A/1205 (Dec. 8, 1949).
28. See UNRWA, Frequently Asked Questions, at www.un.org/unrwa/overview/qa.
html (last visited May 27, 2005).
29. See BENJAMIN SCHIFF, REFUGEES UNTO THE THIRD GENERATION 24 (1995).
30. See id.
31. See UNRWA, Who Is a Palestinian Refugee?, at http://www.un.org/unrwa/ref-
ugees/whois.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2005); see also LEx TAKKENBERG, STATUS OF PALES-
TINIAN REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw, Annex 2, § 2.13 (1998).
32. See TAKKENBERG, supra note 31, at 30.
33. See SCHIFF, supra note 29, at 21.
34. See id. at 46.
35. See id.
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UNRWA.
36
The large sums needed for physical development were not
forthcoming, and the agency reverted to a routine of aiding ref-
ugees to meet their survival needs.37 Education, a traditional
generator of national identity, became a primary and sometimes
controversial focus of UNRWA programming.38 The sensitivities
were reflected by the fact that the contents of textbooks describ-
ing the origins and incidents of the conflict which underlay
UNRWA's work had to be carefully negotiated.39
The conflict waxed and waned over the decades, repeatedly
interrupting the humanitarian and social agenda of UNRWA, in-
cluding in 1956 in Gaza and 1958 in Lebanon.4 ° In 1967, war
uprooted some refugees once again, and resulted in further Pal-
estinian politicization and militancy.4' Shelters became tent cit-
ies once more, and the UNRWA's work was re-oriented to emer-
gency relief over the next two decades.4 2
The Palestinian intifada fundamentally affected the agency.
As this conflict of national aspirations evolved in the midst of the
Israeli occupation, UNRWA added programs and staff, and de-
veloped an innovative protection mandate.43 The agency uti-
lized publicity and the deployment of special staff (Refugee Af-
fairs Officers and Legal Officers) in an effort to provide some
measure of redress for the abuse of refugees.4 4 UNRWA became
an advocate for refugee rights, and a mechanism to report on
and publicize Israeli treatment of Palestinians in the occupied
36. See UNRWA, Establishment of UNRWA, at http://www.un.org/unrwa/over
view/index.html (last visited May 27, 2005).
37. See SCHIFF, supra note 29, at 46.
38. See UNRWA, Programme Management, at www.un.org/unrwa/Programmes/
education/management/html (last visited May 27, 2005).
39. See UNRWA, UNRWA Response to Allegations Made by the Centre Simon
Wiesenthal in its Statement to the Commission on 31 March 2003, available at http://
www.un.org/unrwa/allegations/response.html (last visited May 8, 2005) [hereinafter
Response to Allegations].
40. See SCHIFF, supra note 29, at 13-15, 21.
41. See generally MICHAEL B. OREN, Six DAYS OF WAR: JUNE 1967 AND THE MAKING OF
THE MODERN MIDDLE EAST (2002).
42. See UNRWA, Establishment of UNRWA, supra note 36.
43. See BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights, The
U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, at http://www.
badil.org/Assistance/text0l.htm (last visited May 27, 2005).
44. See Riccardo Bocco, Matthias Brunner & Jamil Rabah, International and Local
Aid During the Second Intifada, at 76 n.1 (July 2001), available at www.dartmonitor.org/
reports/report2/PPPreportI.pdf.
END OF EXILE
territories under the terms of the Fourth Geneva Convention.45
"Protection by publicity" became a key agency strategy.46
Once post-196 7 emergency donations began diminishing,
the agency fell into financial crisis, which persisted until 1983
when budget reforms were introduced.47 Improved stability and
modernized planning and budgetary techniques once again en-
couraged donors to contribute funds.4" The notoriety associated
with the intifada stimulated contributions, but as the emergency
became routine, budgetary shortfalls returned.49
The relations of the agency with the parties to the conflict
were often strained, including the Palestinian Liberation Organi-
zation. 5° Politically, UNRWA balances between collaboration
with the occupying authority, and cooptation by the refugees
and their political organizations. 5' The agency's local employ-
ees, many of whom are refugees, have sought to pressure
UNRWA to take stands on behalf of refugee causes.5 2  The
agency has often had difficulties with host governments, as well
as the Israeli army, over its prerogatives as an international or-
45. See BADIL Resource Center for Palestine Refugee and Residency Rights, What
Role for UNRWA? Opportunities and Constraints: A Durable Solution to the Palestinian Refugee
Issue, Discussion paper prepared for the PRRN Workshop on the Future of UNRWA
(Feb. 2000), available at http://www.badil.org/Publications/Monographs/UNRWA.
Refugees.pdf.
46. See The Secretary-General, Report Submitted to the Security Council by the Secretary-
General in Accordance with Resolution 605 (1987), 28(d), U.N. Doc. S/19443 (Jan. 21,
1988).
47. See General Assembly, Working Group on the Finance of the UNRWA, Report of
the Working Group on the Finance of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine
Refugees in the Near East (1983), 11, U.N. Doc. A/38/558 (Nov. 4, 1983).
48. See id. 12.
49. See The Commissioner-General of the UNRWA, Report of the Commissioner-Gen-
eral of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, 97,
U.N. Doc. A/55/13 (Oct. 15, 2000).
50. See, e.g., Press Release, Palestinian Human Rights Organization, Discord Be-
tween UNRWA and Palestinian Political Party on Appointing a School Principal Keeps
Students in Their Houses (Sept. 13, 2002), available at http://www.euromedrights.net/
PRVCGI/engelsk-show.asp?id=1163; see also Press Release, Palestinian Human Rights
Organization, Camp Popular Committees Become Embroiled in the Conflict Between
UNRWA and a Palestinian Political Party, available at http://www.euromedrights.net/
PRVCGI/engelsk-show.asp?id=1163 (last visited May 16, 2005).
51. See UNRWA, Organization, at http://www.un.org/unrwa/organization/staff.
html (last visited Apr. 14, 2005).
52. See UNRWA, General Information, at http://www.un.org/unrwa/employ-
ment/organization.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2005).
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ganization, a source of continuous and intense negotiations.53
Rumors about whether or not humanitarian facilities and aid
were being diverted to support the intifada were frequently in
the air in the midst of the conflict.5 4 But the agency's experi-
ence in Lebanon taught it that the existence of government, any
government, was preferable to anarchy in terms of a working en-
vironment.55
UNRWA has become enmeshed in the Arab/Palestinian-Is-
raeli conflict.56 The killing of a senior UNRWA official by an
Israeli soldier in a gun battle with Palestinian militants in 2002 is
only the most recent manifestation of a highly polarized situa-
tion in which neutrals are not allowed. 57  At this juncture,
UNRWA is institutionally synonymous with the conflict.58 These
circumstances will inevitably shape UNRWA's role after a resolu-
tion of the conflict.
IV. REFUGEE SOLUTIONS: NEW AND OLD HOMES-
RETURN, LOCAL INTEGRATION, AND
THIRD-COUNTRY RESETTLEMENT
Resolution of the Palestinian refugee question will necessa-
rily involve some combination of three possible place-based out-
comes: 1) some measure of voluntary return, 2) a good deal of
integration in current places of asylum, and 3) perhaps a signifi-
cant degree of resettlement in third countries abroad. Indeed,
the Canadian Prime Minister has reportedly mentioned that Ca-
53. See, e.g. Danielle Haas, Tensions Between Israel, U.N. Near Boiling Point, S.F.
CHRON., Dec. 11, 2002, at A12.
54. See Response to Allegations, supra note 39.
55. See Recommendation on the Situation of the Palestine Refugees, EUR. PARL. Ass., 1 3,
16th Sess., Doc. No. 1090, (1988) (expressing concern over the dire situation of Pales-
tinian refugees in Lebanon).
56. See, e.g., Marc Zell & Sonia Shnyder, Palestinian Right of Return or Strategic
Weapon?: A Historical, Legal and Moral Political Analysis, 8 NEXUSJ. Op. 77, 111 (2003)
(stating that the creation of the United Nations Relief & Works Agency for Palestinian
Refugees in the Near East ("UNRWA") is one key reason why the Palestinian refugee
problem has persisted for over half a century and why the right of return remains the
single greatest obstacle to peace between Arabs and Jews in the Middle East).
57. See Ardi Imseis, On the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Occupied Palestinian Ter-
ritoy, 44 HARV. INT'L LJ. 65, 100 n.376 (2003).
58. See Zell & Shnyder, supra note 56, at 111 n.271 (quoting U.S. Congressman
Thomas Lantos saying: "For too long, UNRWA has been part of the problem, rather
than the solution, in the Middle East .... [I] t is difficult to escape the painful conclu-
sion that UNRWA, directly or indirectly, is complicit in terrorism.").
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nada may accept as many as 15,000 Palestinian refugees living in
other Arab States. 59 While this report is disputed, the notion of
such an offer has resonated in speculations about a settlement.6 °
Of course, the precise dimension of each of these place-based
outcomes, and their inter-relationships, will be grist for the
negotiators' mill.
The generic international regime relating to refugees pro-
vides a starting point for considering a realistic framework for
practical solutions to the Palestinian refugee question. The ge-
neric refugee regime is treaty-based and concerns itself with the
legal status of individuals who fear persecution upon return to
their home country.6 1 Various civil and economic rights are to
be respected by the country of asylum in the protection of refu-
gees.6 2 In practice, this often means the provision of basic hu-
manitarian assistance, and a firm rule, sometimes violated, not to
force refugees back to a place of persecution.63
The centerpiece of the generic regime is the 1951 Conven-
tion relating to the Status of Refugees, as amplified by its 1967
Protocol to deal with refugees around the world. 64 Today, 145
States have signed one of these two U.N. refugee treaties and
have undertaken to provide protection and assistance for indi-
viduals who left their home countries, and who meet the treaty
definition of the term "refugee. '6 5 That is, a person who, "owing
to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the
protection of that country. '6 6 This contrasts with the opera-
tional construct for Palestinian refugees-residence at the speci-
fied place and time, coupled with loss of home and livelihood,
59. See J.T. Amman, Canadian Premier Arrives Today, JORDAN TIMES, Apr. 14-15,
2000, available at www.jordanembassyus.org/04142000002.htm.
60. See, e.g., Rex Brynen, Palestinian Refugees and the Middle East Peace Process, Apr. 3,
1998, available at http://www.arts.mcgill.ca/mepp/newprrn/research/papers/brynen
_980403.htm.
61. See generally U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951,
189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter Refugee Convention].
62. See id. arts. 4-34.
63. See id. art. 33.
64. See Protocol Relat'ng to the Status of Refugees,Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267,
art. 1 (2).
65. See id.
66. Refugee Convention, supra note 61, art. IA(2).
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and the descendants of such persons.67
The implementing institution under the generic regime is
the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees ("UNHCR"). 68
When UNHCR began operations in January 1951, it had a staff
of thirty-four people based mainly in Geneva with a budget of
about U.S.$300,000.6 9 Over the course of the next five decades,
the agency grew into a global institution with 268 offices in 114
countries, a staff of more than 5500 people and a budget ofjust
over U.S.$1 billion.7" UNHCR currently helps approximately
twenty million people around the world.7'
Under the generic regime, each State treaty party has the
discretion to determine whether an individual's situation satis-
fies the refugee definition,72 resulting inevitably in some mea-
sure of differential treatment of like cases. 73 The status-oriented
generic regime largely begs the question of providing a solution
to the situation of international homelessness inherent in the
refugee character. Nevertheless, there is an often-articulated
policy preference, at least by States, for the voluntary repatria-
tion of refugees 74-except in those instances, of course, when a
different preference predominates. Such was the case after
World War II when repatriation from the democratic West to the
socialist East became ideologically disfavored during the Cold
War and resettlement become the norm.75 A more recent in-
stance involved arrangements in the 1980s and 1990s to resettle
Vietnamese and other Indochinese refugees.7 6
Nevertheless, conceptually, repatriation is the most congru-
ent solution to refugee flight. What could be more harmonious
67. See UNRWA, Who Is a Palestine Refugee, supra note 31.
68. See U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], Basic Facts, at http://
www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/basics (last visited May 11, 2005).
69. See UNHCR, Administration, at http://www.unchr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/ad-
min (last visited Apr. 21, 2005),
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See Refugee Convention, supra note 61, art. 12.
73. See, e.g., UNHCR, Home Office Quota Resettlement Scheme, at www.unhrc.
org.uk/resettlement/home-office-scheme.html (last visited May 11, 2005).
74. See, e.g., U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security, How Do I Apply for Resettlement in
the United States as a Refugee?, at uscis.gov/graphics.howdoi.refapp.htm (last visited
Apr. 10, 2005).
75. See UNHCR, Home Office Quota Resettlement Scheme, supra note 73.
76. See Southwest Asia Resource Action Center, Vietnamese Refugees, at www.
searac.org/vietref.html (last visited May 27, 2005).
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than the return home of an exile? Indeed, discussion of this out-
come has been featured through the Palestinian-Israeli con-
flict." The reality, of course, is often quite different. Circum-
stances may have changed, and the community may no longer
exist. Indeed, there may be nothing to which to return. New
homes may beckon, or indeed, may have already been found.
A. Repatriation
The largest recent repatriation program concerns Afghans
returning to Afghanistan from Iran and Pakistan.7" Some two
million Afghans have repatriated since the U.S.-led military cam-
paign ended in 2002. 7" UNHCR has requested U.S.$195 million
to assist return to Afghanistan for 2003, including transportation
and a rather meager reintegration package for individuals com-
prising between U.S.$5 to U.S.$30 to cover transportation costs,
as well as plastic sheeting, flour, and hygiene materials.8 °
Other significant repatriation efforts over the recent past
have included Cambodia where, between March 1992 and April
1993, UNHCR repatriated an estimated 370,000 refugees at the
cost of over U.S.$128 million.8 1 In Mozambique some 1.7 mil-
lion refugees (from six neighboring countries) returned home
from 1992 to 1996, costing around U.S.$150 million.82 In the
case of Namibia, over 40,000 refugees were repatriated by
UNHCR at a cost of U.S.$36 million.83
77. See David K. Shipler, Clashing Rights of Return; A Conflict's Bedrock Is Laid Bare,
N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2001, at Dl.
78. See UNHCR, Refugees by Numbers, 1-6, at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/
texis/vtx/basics/+AwwBmeLqZwMwwwxFqAvxxvW'W9WWwmFqtFEIfgIhFqoUflfRZ2It
Fqtxw5oq5zFqtFElfglAFqoUflfRZ2lDzmxwwwlFqtFEIfgl/opendoc.htm (last visited
Apr. 6, 2005); see also Charlene Porter, More than 500,000 Refugees Return to Afghanistan,
May 8, 2002, available at http://usinfo.org/wf-archive/2002/020508/epf3O9.htm.
79. See UNHCR, Afghanistan: The Most Important Operation, Refugees, Vol. 4 2003,
at 12, available at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/publ/opendoc.pdPtbl=
PUBL&id=400663064.
80. See Porter, supra note 78.
81. UNHCR, Burden-Sharing, ISIL YEAR BK. OF INT'L HUMANITARIAN & REFUGEE L.,
Discussion paper submitted by UNHCR fifth annual plenary meeting of the ACP, availa-
ble at www.worldlii.org/int/journals/ISIL4BIHRL/2001/17.html (last visited Apr. 18,
2005).
82. See UNHCR, Evaluation of UNHCR's Repatriation Operation to Mozambique (1996),
available at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/utx/opendoc.html?bl=RESEARCH&id
=3acbbct90&page=research.
83. See UNHCR, THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES: FIFv YEARS OF HUMANITA-
RIAN ACTION 135 (2000) [hereinafter STATE OF REFUGEES].
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In the 1980's, more than two million people fled their
homes from civil conflict in Central America.84 During the early
1990s most of the 72,000 Nicaraguan refugees were repatriated,
along with 350,000 internally displaced people, and 30,000 for-
mer combatants. 8 5 By the mid-1990s, an estimated 32,000 Salva-
doran refugees had been repatriated.8 6 And by the late 1990s,
42,000 Guatemalan refugees were repatriated from Mexico, with
an additional 22,000 choosing to settle permanently in Mexico.8 v
Refugee repatriation schemes normally involve UNHCR,
which seeks to ensure the voluntariness of return and to provide
transportation and some measure of reintegration assistance.88
International non-governmental organizations ("NGOs") often
are the logistical implementers of return programs.89
The repatriation operations in Cambodia, Central America
and Mozambique reflected a somewhat broader approach to re-
patriation. Unlike the small-scale and short-term operations that
UNHCR had previously engaged in, these new operations
sought to include a longer-term approach which aimed at recon-
struction, peace building, and reintegration.9" The results of
this holistic approach have been difficult to measure.9'
Unlike generic repatriations, questions of voluntariness may
not feature very prominently in the return of Palestinian refu-
gees, since this is, indeed, the declared aim of Palestinian advo-
cates. 2 There will be logistical needs, but depending on the di-
84. See id. at 105.
85. See id. at 139.
86. See id. at 137.
87. See id.
88. See UNHCR, Helping Refugees, at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/
basics (last visited May 11, 2005).
89. See UNHCR, Report on UNHCR's Relations with Non-Governmental Organizations
(1997), available at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/+4wwBmMeDEud
3wwwxFqzvxxq9xmswmFqo7E2RN02lhFqh0kgZTtFqopwGBDnG5zFqmRbZAFqhOkgZT
DzmnxwwwlFqmRbZ/opendoc.htn.
90. See UNHCR, STATE OF REFUGEES, supra note 83.
91. See generally UNHCR, UNHCR GLOBAL REPORT (2000), June 1, 2001, available
at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/template?page=publ&src=static/gr2000/
gr2000toc.htm; see also UNHCR, UNHCR GLOBAL REPORT (1999), Central America Re-
gional Overview, June 1, 2000, available at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/publ/
opendoc.pdPtbl=PUBL&id=3e2d4d611c; UNHCR, UNHCR GLOBAL REPORT (1999),
Cambodia/Thailand Repatriation and Reintegration Operation, June 1, 2000, available at
http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/publ/opendoc.pdf?tbl=PUBL&id=3e2d4d5fO.
92. See SIAML, BADIL Analysis of PSR Poll, available at www.shaml.org/ground/
shukaki/reactions/badil.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2005).
END OF EXILE
mension of repatriation, they may be relatively modest."3 If re-
turn is limited to family unity cases, then there will be a need for
the assessment of family ties, at least once agreement is reached
on the definition of the family concept as it relates to extended
members.94 UNHCR has had some experience with family-re-
lated adjudications for Indochinese and Haitians.95 But it is not
a mainstream activity of the agency, and a variety of NGOs could
be called upon to undertake this work as well.9 6
B. Resettlement
A large-scale Palestinian refugee third-country resettlement
program, on the other hand, would require a new international
framework. Currently, eight countries - Australia, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and the
United States - accept most of the 100,000 or so refugees who
are resettled world-wide each year, with Australia, Canada, and
the United States in the lead.97 Increasingly, UNHCR operates
as a referral mechanism for cases of third-country resettlement,
which the agency considers a remedy of "last resort" to address
individuals with specific needs for protection.9" The Interna-
tional Organization for Migration ("IOM"), governed by a coun-
cil of ninety-eight Member States and thirty-three observer
States, typically provides practical and logistical support for the
movement of resettling refugees.9  National resettlement
groups ordinarily provide integration assistance.' 00
While each country uses the generic refugee definition to
determine eligibility, this is a necessary but not a sufficient con-
dition for admission, and each country applies somewhat distinc-
tive additional criteria for resettlement. Nordic countries, for ex-
93. See generally Dumper, supra note 2.
94. See generally TAKKENBERG, supra note 31, at 262-73.
95. See, e.g., STATE OF REFUGEES, supra note 83, § 4, 6.
96. See UNHCR, Report on UNHCR's Relationships with NGO'S, supra note 89 (ex-
plaining that United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees ("UNHCR") has an op-
erational partnership with about 500 non-governmental organizations).
97. See UNHCR, Refugees by Numbers, supra note 78.
98. But see Don Barnett, Out of Africa, 2 (Oct. 2003), available at htt://www.cis.org/
articles/2003/bacll303.pdf (arguing that resettlement is no longer a last resort).
99. See International Organization for Migration [IOM], What We Do, at http://
www.iom.int/en (last visited April 20, 2005).
100. See, e.g., T.L. Early &J.-P. Costa, Note on International Protection: United Nations
General Assembly: Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme, Fifty-fourth ses-
sion, 2 July 2003, 16 INT'LJ. REFUGEE L., 124, 137 (2004).
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ample, have relatively small resettlement programs, which give
priority to minors or traumatized and disabled refugees. 1 '
Insights into the nature of the special institutional arrange-
ments that would have to be made for a significant resettlement
program for Palestinian refugees can be garnered from other
mass resettlement experiences. A case in point is the effort to
resolve the immense displacements caused by World War II.
Upwards of twenty million people were uprooted in Europe
from 1939 to 1945.02 At the end of the conflict, over ten million
individuals found themselves outside of their home countries
and in need of assistance and protection. 0 3
In 1946, the International Refugee Organization ("IRO")
was established to coordinate resettlement. 10 4 The IRO, which
existed from December 1946 to January 1952, was founded to
focus on the needs for new permanent homes for a residual pop-
ulation of individuals who had fled (refugees) and been dislo-
cated (displaced persons) by reason of World War 11.105 Initially,
this uprooted population was ministered to by a predecessor
U.N. Relief and Rehabilitation Administration ("UNRRA"),
which focused on both societal recovery as well as humanitarian
relief in the context of devastated post-war Europe in the
1940s.'1 6 Unlike UNRRA, the IRO focused specifically on the
refugee question, giving it a coherent organizational mission.'0 7
The IRO was the first major U.N. humanitarian opera-
101. See UNHCR, Easy Guide on Refugee Resettlement Programs 2003/2004 (Oct.
2003), available at http://www.unhcr.org.uk/resettlement/resettlementpdfs/resetle-
ment-programsO3-04.pdf; see also Mette Honore, Resettlement in the Nordic Countries, Mi-
gration Information Source, Sept. 1, 2003, available at http://www.migrationinforma-
tion.org/Feature/display.cfm?id=159.
102. See Kathryn Bockley, A Historical Overview of Refugee Legislation: The Deception of
Foreign Policy in the Land of Promise, 21 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REC. 253, 260 (1995) ("In
the wake of WWII in 1945, a U.S. State Department report described the situation in
Europe as, '... . 20 to 30 million of the people of Europe already [have been] torn from
their moorings by the terrific impact of war.'")
103. See The Postwar Situation in Japan and Germany in Japan and Germany as
High Technology Societies (unpublished thesis, on file with the Univ. of Helsinki)
available at http://www.valt.helsinki.fi/agathon/2521_3.htm.
104. See International Refugee Organization, available at http://www.encyclopedia.
com/html/I/lntlRlefu.asp (last visited April 8, 2005).
105. See id.
106. See id.; see also United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, available at
http://www.encyclopedia.com/html/u/UN1Rleh.asp (last visited Apr. 18, 2005).
107. See International Refugee Organization, The Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia
(6th. ed. 2005), available at http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/history/A0825355.html.
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tion. °8 During its existence, the agency resettled 1,038,750 refu-
gees to 65 different countries, including nearly 300,000 persons
to the United States. IRO's annual budget was in excess of
U.S.$150 million with an administrative budget of nearly U.S.$5
million. At the height of its operations, the agency had 5,600
staff, and arrangements with 120 humanitarian groups, in which
it invested nearly U.S.$40 million to provide ancillary social ser-
vices to refugees and displaced persons. Overall, the IRO ex-
pended over U.S.$400 million.1 °9
The IRO was established as the first U.N. "specialized
agency," although its founders gave relatively little attention to
what this form of organization actually meant.1 ' In practice, the
agency was granted considerable operational independence, as
its programs were not subject to supervision by the General As-
sembly."'1
The predominant mission of the IRO was resettlement in
Western Europe and beyond.'1 2  In the early years of the
agency's operations, there was a small measure of refugee repa-
triation, with the IRO organizing the return of 72,834 refugees
to their home country.' But increasingly unwilling to repatri-
ate, the residue of this displaced population became an object of
international attention as the ideological confrontation of the
Cold War worsened.'1 4 Return to Communist-dominated home-
lands became unpalatable to western governments, most notably
the United States." 5 The IRO, which was funded and thus gov-
erned by western governments, faced early denunciations by the
Soviet bloc as being dedicated primarily to promoting labor mi-
108. See UNHCR, PARTNERSHIP: AN OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK FOR
UNHCR's PARTNERS (Feb. 2003), UNHCR e-Centre, available at http://www.the-ecen-
tre.net/resources/e_library/doc/Operations-ManagementHandbook.pdf [hereinaf-
ter PARTNERSHIP].
109. See International Refugee Organization, available at http://www.mhsc.ca/encyclo-
pedia/contents/15877.htm (last visited May 27, 2005).
110. See Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies,
Nov. 21, 1947, 33 U.N.T.S. 261, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/
englishinternetbible/pard/chapterlII/treaty2.asp.
111. See Constitution of the International Refugee Organization, Dec. 15, 1946, 18
U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon.decade.decad053.htm.
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See PARTNERSHIP, supra note 108, at 7.
115. See STATE OF REFUGEES, supra note 83, ch. 1.
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gration for political purposes.11 6 In this connection, it is inter-
esting to note the difficulty the IRO faced in attempting to reset-
tle refugees with high educational and professional attain-
ments." 7 Manual laborers were preferred in the labor-starved
work places of post-war Europe." 8
Another illustrative mass resettlement scheme was
prompted three decades later by a humanitarian crisis in South-
east Asia. As countries in the region refused to allow asylum
seekers to land, thousands of Vietnamese perished in the South
China Sea. " 9 A terrifying specter emerged, of small, ramshackle
boats containing thousands of desperate refugees roaming the
seas of Southeast Asia, before they either drowned or starved. 2 °
A group of countries led by the United States intervened, creat-
ing programs to relocate some two million individuals at a cost
of U.S.$1 billion plus associated integration costs over a fifteen-
year period.12 1
To begin the effort, in July 1979, the U.N. convened an in-
ternational conference of sixty-five governments, along with in-
ternational organizations and NGO's. 122 The Secretary-General
opened the conference by emphasizing the need for all coun-
tries to realize the obligations and responsibilities of the coun-
tries of origin, asylum and final settlement. 123 "The countries of
origin had an obligation to respect the right of emigration and
family reunification, while avoiding any action," leading to the
departure of their nationals under dangerous conditions. 24
116. See Laura Barnett, Global Governance and the Evolution of International Refugee
Regime, 14 INT'LJ. REFUGEE L. REV. 238, 244 (2002).
117. Cf DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, UNHCR, RESETTLEMENT
HANDBOOK, Nov. 1, 2004, available at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/protect/
opendoc.pdPtbl=PROTECTION&id=3d464a844 (noting that non-protection purposes,
such as opportunities based on higher education, are not of primary importance).
118. See U.N. Economic and Social Council, Report of the International Refugee Organ-
ization on Resettlement of Non-repatriable Refugees and Displaced Persons, U.N. Doc. E/RES/
208(VIII) (March 9, 1949) (asking countries to accept more intellectuals and help
them re-educate themselves professionally), available at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/
texis/vtx/excom/opendoc.htm?tbl=EXCOM&page=home&id=3ae69ef9g 8.
119. See C.N. Le, A Modern Day Exodus, available at www.asian-nation.org/exo-
dus.shtml (last visited May 27, 2005).
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. See UNHCR, Meeting on Refugees and Displaced Persons in South-East Asia, U.N.
Doc. A/34/627 (Nov. 7, 1979).
123. See id. 12.
124. See id.
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They also had a responsibility to cooperate with UNHCR "to en-
sure an orderly outflow. 1 25 Since the countries of asylum were
themselves developing countries with their own social and eco-
nomic problems, it was considered essential that countries
outside the area be primarily responsible for eventual resettle-
ment.
1 26
Pledges were made at the conference by developed coun-
tries to expand greatly the number of refugees they would be
willing to resettle.127 Funding was also pledged to finance the
refugee support and relief operations.128 In order to reduce the
size of the build-up of asylum seekers, Vietnam agreed to en-
force a moratorium on illegal departures from its shores. 12
An initial decline in the number of boat people was not,
however, permanent. In January 1986, Vietnam suspended its
program of orderly departures to the United States, the country
that had accepted most of those legally departing. 3 ° This devel-
opment, coupled with increased arrivals and diminished third-
country resettlement, presented another looming refugee cri-
sis.' 3 ' Representatives of seventy-six governments met in Geneva
in June 1989 at a second international conference on In-
dochinese refugees to establish procedures to screen on a re-
gion-wide basis those asylum seekers who arrived after a cut-off
date in order to determine which among them deserved resettle-
ment as refugees. 3 2 Those rejected were subject to return, in-
cluding mandatory deportation, to Vietnam in order to discour-
age clandestine departures and establish legal emigration as the
eventual sole method of departure."'
This new Comprehensive Plan of Action ("CPA") was
adopted at the conference under which countries in the region
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services, This Month in Immigration History:
July 1979, at http://uscis.gov/graphics/aboutus/history/july79.htm (last visited Apr.
18, 2005).
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. See CHUNG HOANG CHUONG & LE VAN, THE AMERASIANS FROM VIETNAM: A
CALIFORNIA STUDY (1994), at http://www.seacrc.org/media/pdfiles/AmerAsn.pdf.
131. See id.
132. See Josh Briggs, Comment, Sur Place Refugee Status in the Context of Vietnamese
Asylum Seekers in Hong Kong, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 433, 439 (1993).
133. See id.
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agreed to continue to provide first asylum in return for a prom-
ise of resettlement abroad of both the "long stayer" population
as well as more recent arrivals determined to be "refugees," as
defined under U.N. criteria. 134 Status adjudication procedures
were developed on a region-wide basis.1 35 Decisions were made
to be taken by the national authorities in accordance with the
generic criteria.'3 6 UNHCR was to be a trainer and technical
advisor to governments, as well as a monitor of the proceedings,
and source of counseling resource for applicants.1 37 A Steering
Committee of governments was established to implement the
CPA.138
What are the implications of these mass resettlement exper-
iences for a Palestinian refugee resettlement program? The IRO
and CPA experiences suggest Palestinian resettlement could be
effectuated by UNHCR and IOM, although UNHCR's refugee
mandate is qualitatively different, and founded on the generic
refugee concept of a person in flight from persecution.
1 39
Agency culture certainly could complicate matters. Many
UNHCR staff became disenchanted with the concept of resettle-
ment particularly after involvement with resettling refugees from
South East Asia.14 ° "There was not a detailed discussion of who
was and was not a refugee," explained a UNHCR resettlement
official, "the refugee camps were a problem that demanded a
resolution." But many in the agency resented being pressured to
resettle these refugees by the United States, UNHCR's largest
single donor government.1 4' Agency staff saw themselves as un-
willing participants in the creation of an "automatic resettlement
machine.'
4 2
134. See STATE OF REFUGEES, supra note 83, at 84-85.
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. See Refugee Convention, supra note 61, art. I.
140. See MIGRATION POLICY INST., STUDY ON THE FEASIBILITY OF SETTING UP RESET-
TLEMENT SCHEMES IN EU MEMBER STATES OR AT EU LEVEL, AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF
THE COMMON EUROPEAN ASYLUM SYSTEM AND THE GOAL OF A COMMON ASYLUM PROCE-
DURE 7 (2001), at http://www.migrationPolicy.org/pubs/resettdement-study-full-2003-
en.pdf.
141. See Jeremy R. Tarwater, Analysis and Case Studies of the "Ceased Circumstances"
Cessation Clause of the 1951 Refugee Convention, 15 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 563, 618 n.468
(2001) (stating that the United States was the UNHCR's largest donor).
142. SeeJOANNE VAN SELM, STUDY ON THE FEASIBILITY OF SETrING Up RESETTLEMENT
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But when asked, UNHCR engaged and implemented the
broad resettlement objectives of the Indochinese operation, al-
beit with a bit of grumbling. 43 A finite effort relating to Pales-
tinian refugees should be workable, even in an era when resettle-
ment procedures have become enmeshed in national security
considerations. 1
44
Indeed, for a variety of reasons, security issues would likely
permeate any arrangement for Palestinian resettlement. Security
measures implemented after the horrific terrorist attacks in the
United States in September 2001 have radically reduced refugee
admissions. 145 New background checks have slowed the process
and made it more expensive. 146 Some of this delay is caused by
the sequence of processing. 147 Refugees are adjudicated as eligi-
ble and appropriate for admission before investigations are re-
quested. 148 In the case of Palestinian refugees, given the group
nature of the determination, those desiring to avail themselves
of resettlement abroad should be allowed to request a security
check up front. 4 ' Such a procedure would permit applicants to
learn early on whether they may have an entry problem. For
those who do not, the process could be expedited. A speedy and
reliable third-country resettlement solution would help build
confidence on all sides.
A more serious impediment to a significant resettlement ef-
fort concerns the difference between the Palestinian definition
of refugee and the generic concepts. 5 ° The immigration and
SCHEMES IN EU MEMBER STATES OF AT EU LEVEL, AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF THE
COMMON EUROPEAN ASYLUM SYSTEM AND THE GOAL OF A COMMON ASYLUM 32-33 (citing
1985 Executive Committee documents on durable solutions, which state that UNHCR
staff members were opposed to the creation of an automatic resettlement machine).
143. See generally STATE OF REFUGEES, supra note 83, ch. 4.
144. See Maria Stavropolou, The Right Not to Be Displaced, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 689, 740 (1994).
145. See Philip Peters, Issue Brief, Refugee Admissions Remain Below Par, Needs Remain
High, available at http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/immigratioo/040226.asp (last vis-
ited Apr. 17, 2005).
146. See Peters, supra note 145.
147. See Philip Shenon, Threats and Responses: Immigration; New Asylum Policy Comes
Under Fire, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2003, at A22.
148. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PROPOSED REFUGEE ADMISSIONS FOR FY 2004--REPORT
TO THE CONGRESS, 11(B) (1), (Oct. 2003), available at http://www.state.gov/g/prm/asst/
rl/rpts/25691.htm.
149. See Akram & Rempel, supra note 3, at 55.
150. See id. at 55, 63, n.122; see also UNRWA, Who Is a Palestinian Refugee?, supra
note 31.
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refugee laws of the main resettlement countries generally incor-
porate the U.N. refugee standard.15 1 If Palestinian refugees are
to be resettled in significant numbers, then adjustments would
likely have to be made in numerous national legal systems. Po-
tential resettling governments will thus have to review their laws
and make any necessary amendments in order to establish new
or expanded humanitarian admissions authorities that would
cover Palestinians.
C. Local Integration
A local integration strategy will undoubtedly be the predom-
inant solution for Palestinian refugees. This approach will re-
quire a comprehensive assistance and development strategy to
address the well-being of Palestinian refugees as well as the host
communities into which they would more fully assimilate.1"2
This would involve political, legal, social and economic initia-
tives designed to root refugees in their new communities.
UNRWA could, of course, play an important role in this en-
deavor. Indeed, this is what UNRWA has done for much of its
existence-provide assistance verging on development. 153 The
U.N. Development Group and World Bank would also play ma-
jor roles in developing country and regional integration strate-
gies as they did in Cambodia, Central America, and
Mozambique, and in relation to past refugee repatriations. 1 4
Integration assistance, of course, can facilitate resettlement,
local integration, or repatriation. Such assistance can cover mat-
ters such as language instruction, micro-credit lending, reviving
agricultural production, and according citizenship. Develop-
ment aid relating to Palestinian refugees, of course, has always
been a sensitive question.' 55 Refugee advocates have resisted as-
sistance such as housing aid, which might be construed as choos-
151. Maryellen Fullerton, A Comparative Look at Refugee Status Based on Persecution
Due to Membership in a Particular Social Group, 22 COPNELL INT'L L. J. 505, 510 (1993).
152. See Akram & Rempel, supra note 3.
153. See generally UNRWA, Programmes, at http://www.un.org/unrwa/program-
mes/index.html (last visited May 27, 2005).
154. See UNHCR, Cambodia/Thailand Repatriation and Reintegration Operation, in
1999 GLOBAL REPORT (1999); see also UNHCR, Evolution of UNHCR's Repatriation Opera-
tion to Mozambique, available at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/print?l=RE-
SEARCH&id=3ae6bcf90 (last visited Apr. 24, 2005); UNHCR, Central America: Regional
Overview, in 2000 GLOBAL REPORT (2000).
155. See Sahar Aziz, The Laws on Providing Material Support to Terrorist Organizations:
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ing integration and forfeiting the return option.1 56 Extending
benefits to the host community is a conventional wisdom relat-
ing to promoting repatriation and local integration. It is also an
accepted method of dealing with Palestinian refugees camps,
which is necessitated by practical and logistical reasons, albeit
without addressing the formal juridical status of the camps. 157
Generic refugee repatriation efforts over the past few decades
have sought to integrate repatriation and development assis-
tance, with mixed success. 158 Indeed, the difficulty of transition-
ing from humanitarian to development assistance modalities re-
mains one of the principal challenges of humanitarian action in
our era.
1 59
Integration assistance, moreover, can involve substantial
sums. The annual budget of the European Commission's Hu-
manitarian Office ("ECHO") has been running at about C500
million over the past several years, 6 ' with about one-third each
going to refugee reception and integration activities, and about
half that amount used to facilitate voluntary repatriation around
the world.16 t In the region, Israel has been a leading practi-
tioner of integration assistance.' 62 Since 1989, over 1.1 million
persons have emigrated to Israel,' 63 and, in recent years, the
The Erosion of Constitutional Rights or a Legitimate Toolfor Preventing Terrorism?, 9 TEX. J. ON
C. L. & C. R. 45, 87 (2003).
156. See Zell & Shnyder, supra note 56.
157. For instance, Jordan, which hosts forty-one percent of the Palestinian Refu-
gees and ninety percent of the displaced persons, will seek compensation. SeeJordanian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jordan and the Middle East Peace Process, at http://demo.
nets.com.jo/mfa/pages.php?ids=1 3&level=2+level;=2tide-s=Jordan%20And%2OThe%
20Middle%2OEast%20Peace%20Process (last visited May 10, 2005).
158. See Jeff Crisp, Mind the Gap! UNHCR Humanitarian Assistance and the Develop-
ment ProjectJ. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE (2001) [hereinafter Mind the Gap!], available at
http://www.jha.ac/articles/u043.htm.
159. See id.; see also U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
[OCHA], Georgia Humanitarian Situation and Strategy 2003 (Feb. 13, 2003) available at
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB. NSF/db900SID/ SKAR-649JQX? OpenDocument;
Roger Winter, Testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations Committee Sub-
committee on Africa United States Senate (June 15, 2004), available at http://www.
usaid.gov/press/speeches/2004/ty040615_l.html.
160. See European Commission's Humanitarian Office [ECHO], The Budget, at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/echo/finances/budget en.htm (last visited Apr. 15,
2005).
161. See id.
162. See generally Mark J. Altschul, Israel's Law of Return and the Debate of Altering,
Repealing, or Maintaining Its Present Language, 2002 U. ILL. L. REv. 1345 (2002).
163. See MINISTRY OF IMMIGRATION ABSORPTION, IMMIGRATION DATA 2004 2 (2005),
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budget of the Israeli Ministry of Immigration Absorption has
been operating at the equivalent of U.S.$400 million. 164
UNRWA's recent annual expenditures, some portion of which
can be attributed to integration-like assistance for matters such
as education and health, have amounted to approximately
U.S.$300 million. 165
V. COMPENSATION/RESTITUTION COMPARISON
Another feature of a settlement of the Arab/Palestinian-Is-
raeli conflict is likely to be the payment of some form of mone-
tary compensation relating to Palestinian refugees. U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly Resolution 194, passed in 1948, explicitly contem-
plates compensation for property lost by non-returning
Palestinian refugees as a result of the situation in Palestine in
1948.166 Subsequent discussions of compensation have also in-
cluded the claims of Palestinians who were displaced, some a sec-
ond time, by war in 1967, and of Jews from various Arab coun-
tries who moved to Israel during and after 1948 and were forced
to leave behind their property. 167 Negotiators have yet to agree
upon the precise subjects of compensation in resolving the Is-
raeli-Palestinian conflict.1 6
8
Compensation for property loss is only one aspect of the
possibility for financial resource transfers that may be included
in a political settlement. Recent discussions about a settlement
have identified additional payment modalities relating to the sit-
uation of Palestinians who departed from their homes, in effect,
a notion of being "compensated" for the condition of interna-
at http://www.moia.gov.il/english/netunim/netuneyalia_2004.pdf; see also Israeli
Central Bureau of Statistics, Monthly Bull. of Statistics, tbl. E, (Feb. 2002), available at
http:www.cbs.gov.il/yarhon/el_e.htm.
164. See Ministry of Immigration Absorption, The Comptroller, at http://www.
moia.gov.il/english/about/about2.htm#20.%20The%2OController (last visited May 27,
2005).
165. See UNRWA, Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 28.
166. See G.A. Res. 194(111), 11, U.N. Doc. A/RES/194(III), (Dec. 11, 1948).
167. See G.A. Res. 2252, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2252(ES-V) (June 17-18, 1967); see also
G.A. Res. 2452(XXIII), 1 35-42, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2452(XXIII) (A-C) (Dec. 19, 1968);
The Secretary-General , Report of the Secretary General Under Security Council Resolution 331
(1973), U.N. Doc. S/10929 (Apr. 20, 1973).
168. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 59/117, U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/117 (Dec. 10, 2004) (ac-
knowledging unresolved issues of compensation pursuant to G.A. Res. 194(111)).
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tional homelessness associated with being a refugee.169 Raised as
well in discussions are the prospects of payments designed to
help re-establish voluntarily repatriating refugees, to facilitate
their local integration in places of current residence, or their
resettlement abroad in new home countries. 171 Such different
payment purposes would likely require quite divergent financial
schemes.
For those desiring to return to long-lost lands and houses,
confirmation of title may be crucial, particularly if currently oc-
cupied by others. For this purpose, a restitution mechanism
could be used to award possession to returning refugees, like the
Bosnian Commission for Real Property Claims of Displaced Per-
sons and Refugees ("CRPC") established under Annex 7 of the
1995 Dayton Peace Agreement. 71 The Bosnian Property Com-
mission is a mixed body of international and national commis-
sioners, with three international members appointed by the
President of the European Court of Human Rights, and six na-
tional members, of which four are appointed by the Federation
of Bosnia and Herzegovina and two by the Republika Srpska.172
The commissioners have been supported by some 400 local staff,
and twelve regional field offices.1 7 ' As of March 2003, CRPC had
resolved eighty-one percent of the 318,780 claims submitted for
decision.1 7 ' This has required deep investigation of the compli-
cated amalgam of historical legal traditions relating to the regis-
tration of property ownership, ranging from the methods used
under the Austria-Hungarian system to more recent socialist law
enactments, in order to confirm title. 17' But the investigation of
title relating to Palestinian and Israeli property would be just as
complicated. The CRPC is to complete its work in 2003.176
Similar but somewhat less well known mechanisms, the
169. See Helena Cobban, Abu Mazzen in the NYT, JusT WORLD NEWS, Feb. 14, 2003,
available at http://www.justworldnews.org/archives/001125.html.
170. See, e.g., ELlA ZUREIK, PALESTINIAN REFUGEES & THE PEACE PROCESS (1997).
171. See The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Bosn. & Herz.-Croat.-Yugos., Annex 7, ch. 2, art. vii, Dec. 14, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 75. This
agreement is known as the Dayton Peace Agreement.
172. See id. art. 9, § 1.
173. See id. at art. 10, § 1.
174. See Hans Das, Restoring Property Rights in the Aftermath of War, 53 INT'L & COMP.
L. Q. 429, 433 (2004).
175. See Omer Ibrahimagic, The Aggression Upon Bosnia and the Judicial Protection of
Human Rights, 12 CONN. J. INT'L L. 171, 185 (1997).
176. See Das, supra note 174.
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Housing and Property Directorate to mediate disputed claims,
and the U.N. in 1999 in Kosovo to adjudicate rights disputes aris-
ing during Kosovo's post-autonomy period (1989-1999)."' The
Kosovo mechanisms seek to regularize informal property trades
and restore rights to those whose homes have been illegally oc-
cupied. 78 Officials expect to process an estimated 100,000 resi-
dential claims.179
In Kosovo, as of July 2003, 28,587 claims have been filed,
and by the end of 2003, about 13,000 cases had been decided. 80
If mediation fails, then a claim is decided by a three-member
panel of commissioners, one local and two international, and
may be reviewed in limited circumstances by a second panel.' 8 '
The commission decisions are final, and unlike the Bosnian
Commission, may not be reviewed by any other judicial author-
ity, including local courts.18
2
Refugee return became a political imperative in the efforts
of the United States and Western European powers to end the
armed conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo that were spawned after
the disintegration over the past decade of Socialist Federal Re-
public of Yugoslavia. 8  The bundle of human rights violations
designed to displace people, commonly known as "ethnic cleans-
ing," were reflected in property law arrangements which the Bos-
nian and Kosovo mechanisms were designed to unravel. 184 But
while considerable progress has been made at the formal level,
both the Bosnian and Kosovo efforts have confronted difficulties
in implementation by resistant local authorities, reflecting the
tenuous nature of the peace. 185 In Kosovo, for example, as of
177. See Daniel Lewis, Restoring Property Rights in Kosovo 38 U.N. CHRON. 47 (2001),
available at http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/2001/issueI/O01p47.html.
178. See id.
179. See id.
180. See Internal Displacement Monitoring Ctr., Repossession of Residential Properties and
Illegal Occupation: A Slow Process (2002-2005), at http://www.internal-displacement.org/
idmc/website/countries.nsf/ (httpEnvelopes) /326003AB0480337B802570B8005AAA3B
?OpenDocument (last visited Apr. 17, 2005).
181. See Lewis, supra note 177.
182. See id.
183. See, e.g., Gabriel Partos, Balkan Refugee Crisis Eases, BBC NEws, Mar. 18, 2005,
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4360555.stm.
184. See ROGER COHEN, Ethnic Cleansing, in CRIMES OF WAR 136 (1999), available at
http://www.crimesofwar.org/thebook/ethnic-cleansing.html.
185. See Answers.com, Kosovo War: Information from Answers.com, at www.an-
swers.com/topic/Kosovo-war (last visited Apr. 20, 2004).
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December 2002, only 681 forced evictions had been executed.
Palestinian refugee advocates have urged, as an acknowl-
edgement of accountability for past injustices, a restitution-based
approach to restore property to absent refugees and simultane-
ously protect the rights of current occupants as tenants.' 86 This
is tantamount to ownership with no right to oust the current oc-
cupying tenant. But care should be taken not to introduce con-
flictual elements in an already tense situation. Such inconclusive
arrangements could precipitate disputes along the line of those
experienced in Bosnia and Kosovo.
Moreover, the objectives of a compensation scheme can be
decisive. The Bosnian property commission and the more re-
cent effort in Kosovo are designed to confirm property owner-
ship in order to permit persons to regain possession.18 7 Local
authorities have resisted compliance."8 8 As a lawyer familiar with
claims and restitution mechanisms put it, "It is easier to dish out
money than implementing solutions on the ground."
But even monetary compensation for lost Palestinian refu-
gee and Israeli property will present several challenges. Such
compensation arrangements will require the establishment of a
special institution for the duration of the scheme. While there
are unique features in the situation, there are other experiences
which may provide useful insights for the development of such
mechanisms.
In fact, there is a long history of using international claims
tribunals to settle disputes, many dealing with alien property.
From the Jay Treaty of 1794 between the United States and Brit-
ain, until World War II, claims tribunals were often used to effec-
tuate war reparations.189 Such tribunals, however, came to be
considered too slow and overly expensive, leading increasingly to
the use of lump sum agreements.1 90 These involved State-to-
State payments, with the claimant State expected to distribute
186. See, e.g., Hussein Ibish & Ali Abunimah, Point/Counterpoint: The Palestinians'
Right of Return, 8 HuMAN RTS. BRIEF 4 (2001), available at http://www.wcl.american.
edu/hrbrief/08/2palestinians.cfm.
187. See John M. Scheib, Threshold of Lasting Peace: The Bosnian Property Commission,
Multiethnic Bosnia and Foreign Policy, 24 SYRACUSEJ. INT'L L. & CoM. 119, 121-22 (1997).
188. See id. at 127-28, 131.
189. See Eyal Benvenisti & Eyal Zamir, Private Claims to Property Rights in the Future
Israeli-Palestinian Settlement, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 295, 332 (1995).
190. See id.
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funds to individuals, and the paying State obtaining a categorical
release of its obligations. 191
A new generation of compensation mechanisms emerged
with the advent of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal. The Tribunal
was established by the two States in 1981 as part of the settlement
of the crisis which began with the seizure of the U.S. Embassy in
Tehran and the freezing of Iranian assets in the United States. 192
While the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal proved relatively
effective in resolving commercial disputes involving U.S. govern-
ment agencies and private firms,193 it was less effective in rela-
tion to the claims of private U.S. citizens who had left Iran.'9 4
Awards, mainly to U.S. claimants, were paid out of frozen bank
assets. 195
More recently, the U.N. Compensation Commission
("UNCC"), was set up in 1991 by the U.N. Security Council to
process claims and pay compensation for direct losses resulting
from Iraq's 1990 invasion and subsequent occupation of Ku-
wait."' The UNCC is governed by a council comprising the fif-
teen members of the U.N. Security Council, 97 which declared
Iraq liable under international law for these losses.' 98 In terms
of its program, the UNCC has a supporting secretariat of some
200 persons, and uses eighteen three-member panels of commis-
sioners who act as quasijudges in the examination of claims.' 99
Under UNCC procedures, individual claims are presented by
governments, and payments to claimants are made through gov-
ernments.
200
191. See id. at 334.
192. See Iran-United States Claims Tribunal [IUSCT], Background, at http://www.
iusct.org/background-english.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2005).
193. See id.; see also IUSCT, Claimants Named in the Awards and Decisions Issue, at
http://www.iusct.org/lists-eng.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2005) [hereinafter IUSCT
Claimants].
194. See IUSCT Claimants supra note 193.
195. See IUSCT, Declaration Of The Government Of The Democratic And Popular Republic
Of Algeria, Jan. 19, 1981, at http://www.iusct.org/general-declaration.pdf.
196. See generally, The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to
Paragraph 19 of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), U.N. Doc. S/22559 (May 2, 1991)
(establishing the U.N. Compensation Committee).
197. See S.C. Res. 687, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (Apr. 3, 1991).
198. See id.
199. See U.N. Compensation Commission [UNCC], The Commissioners, at http://
www2.unog.ch/uncc/commiss.htm (last visited Apr. 23, 2005); see also UNCC, at The
Secretariat, http://www2.unog.ch/uncc/secretar.htm (last visited Apr. 23, 2005.
200. See S.C. Res. 986, U.N. Doc. S/RES/986 (Apr. 14 1995).
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The UNCC has become the epitome of a mass claims exer-
cise. Since its inception, the UNCC has adjudicated approxi-
mately 2.6 million claims, ninety-nine percent of which have
been resolved, with nearly U.S.$44 billion in compensation be-
ing awarded (U.S.$18 billion of which has actually been paid) .2°1
Since 1995, UNCC awards have been funded by the U.N. Oil-for-
Food Program established by the Security Council in 1995 to
mitigate the adverse effects of economic sanctions on the people
of Iraq. 20 2 Both the UNCC and Oil-for-Food ended in 2003.203
In recent years, the quest to right historical wrongs has led
to the proliferation of new claims mechanisms which came
about under the pressure of U.S. class action court litigation.
Notable among the efforts is the German foundation (Remem-
brance, Responsibility and the Future) which was established in
2000, and funded by the German State and a consortium of pri-
vate companies to compensate individuals for Nazi abuses such
as slave and forced labor, as well as property lOSS. 2 04 Approxi-
mately two million claims have been brought by or on behalf of
Jewish and non-Jewish former slave and forced laborers. 215
The German foundation is governed by a board of trustees,
staffed by a management group, and operates through a com-
plex system utilizing a group of seven partner organizations that
process claims from different categories of eligible claimants and
that make payments to those claimants.2 6 The 1OM, for exam-
ple, is one of the partner entities which, in its German Forced
201. See UNCC, The Claims, at http://www2.unog.ch/uncc/theclaims.htm (last
visited May 10, 2005).
202. See UNCC, UNCC at a Glance, at http://www.unog.ch/uncc/ataglance.htm
(last visited May 10, 2005); see also Office of the Spokesman for the Attorney-General,
Use of Sanctions Under Chapter VIII of the U.N. Charter (Jan. 2006), available at
http://www.un.org/News/ossg/sanction.htm.
203. See S.C. Res. 1483, § 16, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003); see also
UNCC at a Glance, supra note 202.
204. See Press Release, IOM, IOM Paid Almost 10 Percent of Presumably Eligible
Claims (Jan. 30, 2002), available at http://www.swissbankclaims.iom.int/English/docs/
PR%20G%201.02e.pdf.
205. See Press Release, IOM, IOM Pays Maximum Amounts to German Industry's
Forced Labourers (Jan. 21, 2005), available at http://www.compensation-for-forced-la-
bour.org/english-home.html (then select "Press Releases" from the menu on the left,
then select the above named press release from the list of press releases).
206. See Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and
the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany Concerning the Foundation "Re-
membrance, Responsibility and the Future," Annex AJul. 17, 2000, available at http://
www.compensation-for-forced-labour.org/english-home.html (then select "Docu-
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Labour Compensation Programme, has received approximately
330,000 slave and forced labor claims on a global basis for non-
Jewish claimants. 2 7 IOM has set up a separate Property Claims
Commission to address more than 27,500 property claims.20 8
However, as of May 2003, only 3182 have been resolved (703 pos-
itively and 2479 negatively) .209 These activities have preoccupied
a substantial portion of IOM's staff in Geneva. 21 0
A similar compensation scheme was established under a
Swiss Banks Settlement, reached in U.S. class action litigation in
2001.211 The Settlement Agreement provided U.S.$1.25 billion
to settle claims by members of five represented classes of Nazi
victims and their heirs who had deposited assets in Swiss
banks.21 2 Significantly, the Swiss Banks Settlement mechanism
includes an innovative "refugee" class of claimants-persons
who attempted to flee Nazi persecution and who were refused
entry into Switzerland and were abused thereafter. 213 Approxi-
mately 6380 claims were made under the refugee class category,
and, as of May 2003, the Jewish Claims Conference has recom-
mended that 1180 of the claimants, mostly Holocaust survivors,
be awarded a total of U.S.$2 million. The remaining refugee
class claimants are mostly heirs and have yet to be reviewed.
These recent mass claims facilities ordinarily have three
functional organs: one that sets and oversees policy, another
that adjudicates the claims, and a third that supports the process
administratively. Rules are ordinarily developed during the pro-
cess, and the participation of the parties is limited.214 Eviden-
ments" from the menu on the left, then select the above named document from the list
of documents).
207. See IOM, Fact Sheet: General Information on the German Forced Labor Compensation
Programme, 2, Mar. 2004, available at http://www.compensation-for-forced-labour.
org/pdf/FactSheet 03 04_%20e.pdf.
208. See id. 14.
209. See id. 16.
210. See id.
211. See In re Holocaust Victims Assets Litig., 311 F.Supp. 2d 363 (E.D.N.Y. 2004)
(explaining the class action settlement reached between Holocaust survivors and Swiss
banks).
212. See id. at 365-66.
213. See id. at 365; see alsoJewish Claims Conference, Claims Conference Programs:
Swiss Banks Settlement Refugee Class, available at http://www.claimscon.org/index.asp
?url=swiss/settlement (last visited Apr. 20, 2005).
214. See Morris A. Ratner, Factors Impacting the Selection and Positioning of Human
Rights Class Actions in U.S. Courts, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 623 (2003).
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tiary standards are more relaxed than in more formal court pro-
ceedings, and claimants are often assisted in the efforts to pre-
sent and substantiate their claims. Processing methodologies
and techniques in the various claims programs are similar.215
Monetary awards or restitution are generally enforced within the
specially-established system.216
A compensation scheme for lost Palestinian refugee prop-
erty would introduce complications relating to the identification
of refugee properties and choosing from among a range of
methods of valuation. While much documentation has been col-
lected on this question, these controversies have yet to be au-
thoritatively resolved.217 In furtherance of a settlement, it would
be necessary to map out the universe of refugee property and
assign values to the individual properties. In addition, compen-
sation may be limited by the overall level of funds provided for
this purpose, introducing yet another series of complexities.
Perhaps the most authoritative statistics assembled to date
on the scope and value of Arab property was produced by the
technical program of the U.N. Conciliation Commission for Pal-
estine ("UNCCP"), which began its work in 1952, and which re-
ported initially in 1964.218 This report was amended in certain
respects by the computerization of the underlying data in
2000.219 The UNCCP Property database contains some 453,000
records documenting about 1.5 million individual holdings. 220
The project calculated the scope of Arab land at 4,851,613.98
dunums (one dunum equals 1,000 square meters), with a value
of 100,383,784 Palestinian pounds2 1 (one Palestinian pound in
215. See id.
216. See id.
217. See Rex Brynen, Financing Palestinian Refugee Compensation, July 14-15, 1999,
available at http://www.arts.mcgill.ca/mepp/new-prrn/research/papers/brynen_9907
14.htm.
218. See Michael R. Fishbach, The United Nations and Palestinian Refugee Property, 31
J. OF PALESTINAN STUD. 34, 34-35 (2002).
219. See Michael R. Fishbach, The Usefulness of the UNCCP Archives for Palestinian
Refugee Compensation/Restitution Claims, Paper presented at the Stocktaking Conference
on Palestinian Refugee Research, 15 (Jun. 17-20, 2003), available at http://network.
idrc.ca/uploads/user-S/10576732560Session_7-_Michael-Fishbach-_Paper.doc.
220. See BADIL Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights,
The U.N. Conciliation Commission for Palestine, at http://www.badil.org/Protection/
UNCCP.htm (last visited Apr. 27, 2005).
221. See id.
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1948 was the equivalent of U.S.$4.03).2 2 2 Nevertheless, the fact
that the exact scope and value of Palestinian refugee land con-
tinues to be debated by scholars and officials prompted the au-
thor of a forthcoming book on the question to include the ab-
stracts of sixteen different studies of the question in the book's
appendix.223
In organizing a program of work, a compensation facility
relating to Palestinian refugees would have to issue procedural
rules, including a deadline for submission of claims, and design
a claims form that requests all relevant information. Experience
with other efforts teaches that close attention should be paid at
the outset to the design of such a form in order to ensure both
comprehensiveness and understandability. 224 This will be partic-
ularly important as many claimants will be unfamiliar with such
forms. As has been used with the German foundation and Bos-
nian property commission, a helpline and proactive efforts to
facilitate the filing of claims will be needed.
In a Palestinian refugee claims mechanism, UNRWA would
be an obvious resource in terms of notifying potential refugee
claimants of the procedures and deadline for the filing of claims;
however, it cannot be the exclusive mechanism, because many
refugees have no contact with the agency. A special outreach
effort would be needed, particularly for claimants outside of the
region of UNRWA's mandate.
Compensating refugee property claims would be more com-
plicated and take longer than paying out departure claims, prob-
ably requiring a decade or so to complete the task given the ex-
perience of other property claims efforts. But relatively quick
closure on this contentious issue could help to build confidence
between the parties and avert renewed tensions.
A variety of measures could be used to expedite payments.
Individual property values can be assessed using standardized
methodologies. Claims that present common features can be
222. See id.
223. See Refugees Int'l, Palestinian Refugees Face Humanitarian Crisis as Violence Con-
tinues (Apr. 5, 2002), at http://www.refugeesinternational.org/content/articke/detail/
794.
224. See Vandana Patel, A Comparative Analysis of Mass Claims Mechanisms, Paper
presented at the Stocktaking Conference on Palestinian Refugee Research (Jun. 17-20,
2003), available at http://web.idrc.ca/uploads/user-S/1057856517OSession_8_Vandana
_Patelnew.doc.
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grouped and sampling techniques can be used to check the ac-
curacy of groupings. As was done in the case of the German
Foundation, a relaxed evidentiary standard demanding that
claims be supported by only plausible proof could be used to
take into account the loss of documentation and memory that
typically accompanies the passage of time.225
Determining the adequacy of compensation will be a key
issue. Methods and techniques exist to determine the value of
refugee property, either by individual valuation or through esti-
mates.226 An overarching issue will be whether the funds availa-
ble are sufficient to satisfy the claims, and if not, whether the
financial resources available are sufficient to provide adequate
compensation.
For example, funding limitations might require that only a
pro rata portion of property claims be paid, but it would be nec-
essary even in this event to identify the claims and assign them
values for purposes of equity. Whether based on departure or
property loss, threshold estimates are likely to be inexact to
some extent.227 One method of dealing with the resulting un-
certainty is to pay fixed claims in installments, say the first sixty
percent of the claim, until all claims are paid and an upward
bound resource obligation is calculated. This could be followed
by payment of the last installment of forty percent, or a lesser
remainder. Such a procedure has been used for German foun-
dation claims.228
Information and evidence contained in claims forms must
be verified by using sources such as the UNCCP database or
UNRWA records. As UNRWA evolved over five decades, it regis-
tered a growing and shifting refugee population and collected
millions of records. 229 The agency received records from the In-
ternational Committee of the Red Cross and the American
Friends Service Committee, which in 1948 the U.N. requested to
provide relief to Palestinian refugees in the region before the
225. See 1OM, Fact Sheet, supra note 207, 8.
226. See generally Benvenisti & Zamir, supra note 189, 229-335.
227. See Ibish & Abunimah, supra note 186, at 7.
228. See Karen Helig, Stephen A. Risenfeld Symposium 2001: From the Luxembourg
Agreement to Today: Representing a People, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 91, 146, 189-92 (2002).
229. See, e.g., UNRWA, Total Registered Refugees per Country and Area, at www.
un.org/unrwa/publications/statis-01.html (last visited May 27, 2005).
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establishment of UNRWA.23" Archives of records exist in Leba-
non and Syria as well as in a Unified Registration System created
in 1995.281
Details about current UNRWA recipients of relief and social
services, some 225,000 individuals, are contained in a computer
database.232 Records relating to another 800,000 families exist,
but are not computerized.23 A U.S.$6 million proposal by
UNRWA to scan the family files into a database, if funded, might
take upwards of three years or more to implement, according to
UNRWA staff.23
4
The special institution to arrange compensation for Pales-
tinian refugees will require a policy body comprising the princi-
pal stakeholders, commissioners to decide claims, and a support-
ing secretariat. Disputes over property claims could be resolved
by an independent appeals board, as provided for in the Ger-
man foundation claims procedure. A specific waiver of judicial
remedies could avoid complicated institutional disputes which
have vexed the Bosnian Property Commission. 2 5
A different set of technical issues would be raised in the or-
ganization of a refugee fund. In particular, once a fund is estab-
lished to defray the social costs associated with refugee return,
integration and resettlement, it could be replenished through
periodic financial contributions by donor governments for these
purposes. Funds would be dispersed, as is normally the case,
upon the preparation of needs assessments relating to the refu-
gees and their communities and specific project proposals. 236
Implementation could be evaluated for effectiveness.
Another approach still would likely be needed in order to
organize payments for the departure of individuals. In this in-
stance, in order to fix appropriate payment amounts, funds
would be committed by governments at the outset. In addition,
the number of eligible refugee claimants would have to be iden-
230. See UNRWA, Overview, Frequently Asked Questions, at www.un.org/unrwa/
overview/qa.html (last visited May 27, 2005).
231. See UNRWA, Unified Registration System, at www.un.org/unrwa/program-
mes/rss/unified.html (last visited May 27, 2005).
232. See id.
233. See id.
234. See id.
235. See Scheib, supra note 187, at 126.
236. See Benvenisti & Zamir, supra note 189, 333-34.
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tified in order to calculate the level of compensation. This
would raise contentious questions concerning who is a refugee,
and how many refugees would be eligible to claim, including de-
scendants of those who originally left Palestine.
Threshold definitional issues will concern such matters as
the notion of refugee descendants, raising issues such as how
many generations and what degree of relationship. How will loss
of livelihood be evaluated? What about individuals who re-
mained inside Israel? Or those uprooted in 1976 from the West
Bank and Gaza who are sometimes referred to as "displaced per-
sons."237 Once numbers have been identified, and once the
amount of funds available is fixed, then lump sum payments for
individuals and families could be calculated and paid to the indi-
viduals.
These claims would be similar in some respects to the de-
parture claims that were paid under category "A" of the UNCC
category. "A" claims are those of individuals who had to leave
Kuwait or Iraq between the date of the invasion of Kuwait by
Iraqi forces on August 2, 1990, and the date on which the Iraqi
occupation came to an end on March 2, 1991.238 Compensation
for successful claimants in this category was fixed at U.S.$2500
for individuals and U.S.$5000 for families (U.S.$4000 and 8000,
respectively, if claims were not lodged in other categories). In
the case of the UNCC, payments to individuals were made by the
governments that presented the claims.
The new generation of compensation mechanisms has
proven workable, in part, because of the application of modern
information technology and sampling methods. A lawyer who
worked with the Iran-U.S. claims tribunal, and who was deeply
involved with the operations of the UNCC, emphasized the im-
portance of computerization in organizing claims for processing.
This requires an investment of resources up front but is "critical
to the success" of any compensation effort.
The failure by governments to provide money at the outset,
for example, slowed the work of the Bosnian Property Commis-
sion substantially. 23 9 The entire enterprise was "a last minute
237. See id. at 308, 319, 320 n.139.
238. See id.
239. See Ann Davies, Restitution of Land and Property Rights, FORCED MIGRATION REV.,
Sept. 21, 2004, available at http://www.fmreview.org/text/FMR/21/O4.htm.
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thought" in peace negotiations, according to an official with the
commission. 24" Like the restitution mechanism in Kosovo, the
Bosnian Commission was starved for funds from the outset and
only began to have an impact when it began to produce deci-
sions and build the confidence of claimants. 241
However, the basic formula for a successful claims effort can
be discerned from the experience of the past decade. As a law-
yer familiar with the German Foundation claims program and
UNCC noted, to be effective a claims scheme had to have both a
"human face," referring to outreach and facilitates activities, as
well as a "cold technical" capacity in the form of sophisticated
information technology and computerization.2 4 2
VI. IN ANTICIPATION OF SETTLEMENT
A settlement of the Palestinian refugee question would re-
quire a number of interrelated program components relating to
repatriation, local integration, and resettlement. In addition to
these place-based options, there would also need to be mecha-
nisms for compensation arrangements. The components must
be melded together in order to fashion a coherent international
response.
An assemblage of new and old tasks would be necessary for
dealing with the Palestinian refugee question. This might mean
the creation of a new time-limited unified entity, like the IRO, in
effect a Palestinian Refugee Organization, or a situation-based
solutions program, like the Indochinese Comprehensive Plan of
Action, in this instance a CPA for Palestinian refugees. While
coherence of effort would be promoted by a unified entity, there
is an understandable reluctance by donor governments to create
new international organizations, particularly to deal with time-
bound problems. This is often a criticism leveled against
UNRWA.2 43
240. See Susan F. Martin & Andrew I. Schoenholtz, Asylum in Practice: Successes,
Failures-the Challenges Ahead, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 584, 591 (2000).
241. See Davies, supra note 239.
242. See Martin & Schoenholtz, supra note 240, 591.
243. See Press Release, Simon Wiesenthal Ctr., Wiesenthal Center to UN Secretary-
General: "Investigate UNRWA's Role in Perpetuation of the Middle East Conflict"
(Mar. 10, 2002) available at http://www.wiesenthal.com/site/apps/s/content.asp?c=fw
LYKnN8LzH&b=253162&ct--286102; see also UNRWA, Setting the Record Straight (Apr.
9, 2003), available at http://www.un.org/unrwa/allegations (last visited May 27, 2005).
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UNRWA itself is too bound up with the underlying conflict
to be the aegis for these multifaceted activities, and build confi-
dence among parties which are likely to be wary even after a po-
litical settlement.244 While UNRWA has many important contin-
uing roles to play, 45 something new would be needed. This in-
cludes a discrete compensation mechanism, which could be
either a program component of an existing organization, like
IOM's property commission, or a free-standing but related or-
ganization, like the Bosnian Property Commission.
The I.R.O. experience provides the case for a separate,
time-limited new agency in order to focus the mission. And
while implementation would likely take many years, as did the
work of the I.R.O., a separate dedicated agency could go out of
existence at a future time when the problem it was mandated to
address has been resolved. 46 While compensation activities re-
quire different sets of skills and tasks, a degree of comprehen-
siveness would be achieved by having one institutional rubric
that included these activities as well, particularly if compensation
were envisioned to help defray the costs of return, integration,
and resettlement abroad.
Many issues relating to institutional framework and imple-
menting procedures would have to await a settlement. But nego-
tiations could address some critical matters which would facili-
tate resolution, such as was done in the property annex to the
1995 Dayton Peace Accord that ended the Bosnian conflict.24 7
For example:
1. The terms "Palestinian refugee" and "family" should be
defined in the settlement. This could give settlement imple-
menters guidance on issues of what type of property loss is sub-
ject to compensation (loss of home and livelihood). It will also
give donors and others a sense of the potential numbers of
244. See Press Release, Simon Wiesenthal Center, supra note 243.
245. See, e.g., U.N. Ass'n of the U.K., Little-heard News of the Middle East, at http:/
/www.una-uk.org/archive/me/unrwa.html (last visited May 27, 2005).
246. See Palestinian Refugee Research Net, Palestinian Refugees and Final Status:
Key Issues, at http://www.arts.mcgill.ca/MEPP/PRRN/prissues.html (last visited May
27, 2005); see also Committee on Migration, Refugees, and Demography, Council of
Europe Parliamentary Assembly, The Situation of Palestinian Refugees, Doc. 9808 (May 15,
2003) available at http://assembly.coe.int/main.asp?Link=documents/workingdocs/
doc03/edoc9808.htm.
247. See generally RICHARD HOLBROOKE, To END A WAR (1998) (detailing the use of
annexes in the Dayton Peace Accord).
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claimants, including descendants, as well as those in need of new
homes or old homes;
2. The best evidence of refugee property ownership should
be identified, such as the UNCC records. While there may be
lingering disputes at the margins that must be resolved, a con-
sensus on this issue will enable claims work to begin so that refu-
gees can see the benefits of a settlement quickly and begin to
gain confidence in the process; and
3. If a new unified organization with a designated inter-gov-
ernmental management structure is not established, then a
steering group of interested governments should be created to
oversee and provide policy guidance to the array of interna-
tional organizations and NGOs that would be responsible for im-
plementing a multi-faceted set of initiatives designed to resolve
the refugee question. This body could also oversee the revision
of national laws that would be necessary to implement a third-
country resettlement program. A similar approach was taken in
the Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indochinese refugees.248
Generic refugee solutions have evolved over the past cen-
tury, and institutional mechanisms have been refined to imple-
ment these solutions. 24 9 Similarly, mass compensation claims
techniques and frameworks have evolved. 250 While arrange-
ments for Palestinian refugees will be complex, there is ample
experience out of which to fashion the institutional framework,
procedures, and criteria to implement a plausible settlement.
All that remains is for the parties to make peace.
248. See generally W. Courtland Robinson, The Comprehensive Plan of Action for In-
dochinese Refugees, 1989-97: Sharing the Burden and Passing the Buck, 17 J. OF REFUGEE
STUD. 319 (2004).
249. See Barnett, supra note 116.
250. See, e.g., UNCC, The UNCC at a Glance, at www2.unog.ch/uncc/
ataglance.htm (last visited Apr. 23, 2005).
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